realizes that this will not mean equal shares for all. There must be the same ratio between the persons, or services, and the things.777 In the “mutual exchange of services,” the law must be proportional requital.778 In other words, each should receive an equivalent to what he contributes.779 Distribution must thus proceed according to a certain standard of worth or desert (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τινά).780 If the individuals are unequal, their shares cannot be equal, and it is a prolific source of dispute, whenever equals receive unequal shares, or unequals receive equal.781 On the other hand, Aristotle recognizes that it is a difficult matter to determine this standard, by which just distribution is to proceed.782 At this point, again, he shows clearly that his paramount interest in the problem is not economic. He names four possible standards—freedom, wealth, noble birth, and general excellence—all of which are distinctly political in their reference.783
Though he insists on a fair distribution of wealth to the citizens, he can hardly be said to exhibit as much interest in the welfare of the common people as does Plato. He had not a very ideal conception of human nature in general. He would have