CHAPTER II. PASCAL’S SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES.

verified by the experiments in Auvergne.¹⁴ It may be granted beyond doubt this was the case. It would ill become any admirer of Pascal to detract from the glory of Descartes. But it must be held no less firmly, that in the personal question raised by Descartes’s letter, the balance of evidence is all in favour of Pascal. There are no indications that the two men ever met save on the occasion so frankly described by his sister Jacqueline. Before this Pascal had not only been busy with the subject, but says distinctly that he had meditated the experiment finally made on the Puy de Dôme from the time that he published his first researches.¹⁵ It was not, indeed, till about six weeks after Descartes’s visit, or on the 15th December 1647, that he communicated with M. Périer regarding these experiments, and his earnest desire that they should be made; and it was not till the following September, or about a year after Descartes’s visit, that they were actually made. But it is incredible that Pascal could have written as he did if he had really, for the first time, been indebted to Descartes for the suggestion. Descartes’s name is not mentioned in his correspondence with M. Périer, nor in any of his writings on the subject; and the delay in making the experiments is sufficiently explained by the facts stated by himself, that they could only be made effectually at page 44some place of greater elevation than he could command—such as “Clermont, at the foot of the Puy de Dôme”—and by some person, such as M. Périer, on whose knowledge and accuracy he could rely. If we add to this the force of the statement already quoted from his letter to M. Ribeyre, four years afterwards, or in 1651, that he claimed the experiments as entirely “his own invention,” and that he did so “boldly,” the case seems put beyond all doubt—unless we are to suppose the author of the ‘Provincial Letters’ and the ‘Thoughts’ capable of wilful suppression of the truth. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to attribute to Descartes anything beyond a mistaken opinion of the value of certain statements which he had no doubt made to Pascal, and possibly some confusion of memory. And that this is not an unwarranted view appears from what he says in a subsequent letter