may exercise abroad is voluntarily or tacitly con- ferred by that respect which motives of public policy dispose other nations to yield to them.' The next maxim, and which flows as a natural ' Huberus Covflictu Legum, p. 538. " Rodenburgli, Paul Voet, and BouUeuois announce, in substance, this and the following rule.
' Henry ore Foreign Law, p. 1 ; 1 Boullenois Prin. Gen., 6, p. 4.
CONFLICT OF LAW. 95 consequence from the first, is that no State or nation can by its laws bind or affect any person or property out of its own territory. ' This rule springs, of course, ■from the exclusiveness and absolute sovereignty which every nation possesses within its own terri- tory. It is the necessary result of the dignity and independence of distinct Governments.^ The last general principle is, that any force or obligation which the laws of one nation may have in another, depends solely upon the express or imphed consent of the latter, or its own proper juris- j^rudence.^ Thus a State may prohibit or admit the operation of foreign laws. It may recognize or give effect to some, and refuse the same notice to others.
And it is for a "nation to form its own judgment of what its conscience prescribes to it ; of what it can or cannot do ; of what is proper or improper for it to do," in giving effect within its own territories to the laws of another country.' But when its own statutes or common law are positive on the subject, they are to be obeyed to the exclusion of all other law. If, however, both these are silent, then, and then only, can the question arise, what law is to govern in the absence of any express declaration of the sovereign's will? And the courts in this case presume the tacit adoption of the foreign rules by ' Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. K., 4 ; Ban/c of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters. R., 584.
' These rules are the same in substance as the three axioms laid down by Huberus j for which, see j>ost.
' Vattel, Prelim. Discs., p. 61.