which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a junction with the corps d’armee of Macdonald, who had been ordered to quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.
Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into the mountains.
To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able to preserve.
By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his force upon the points necessary for that purpose.
Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.
By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important positions of