political passions and passion for politics. If, in spite of this, those remaining are recalcitrant, we will abolish them completely by appealing to the majority of the people.
The appointment of the president and vice presidents of the Chamber and Senate will be the prerogative of the president. Instead of continuous parliamentary sessions, we will shorten them to a few months. Moreover, the president, as chief executive, will have the right to convene or dissolve parliament, and in the case of dissolution, defer the appointment of a new parliament. But to prevent the president from being held responsible before our plans are matured for the results of all these essentially illegal actions inaugurated by us, we will give the ministers and other high administrative officials surrounding the president the idea of circumventing his orders by issuing instructions of their own. Consequently, they will be made responsible instead of him. We recommend that the execution of this plan be given especially to the Senate, State Council, or Council of Ministers, and not to individuals. Under our guidance the president will interpret in ambiguous ways such existing laws as it is possible so to interpret. Moreover, he will annul them when the need is pointed out to him by us: he will also have the right to propose temporary laws and even modifications in the constitutional work of government, alleging as the motive for so doing the exigencies of the welfare of the country.
By such measures we will be able to destroy gradually, step by step, everything that, upon entering into our rights, we were obliged to introduce into government constitutions as a transition to the imperceptible abolition of all constitutions, when the time comes to convert all government into our autocracy.
The recognition of our autocrat may come even before the abolition of the constitution; the moment for this recognition will come when the people, tormented by dissension and the incompetency of their rulers, incited by us,