The relation between these two facts is not unanalyzable, since the meaning of a proposition results from the meaning of its constituent words. The meaning of the series of words which is a proposition is a function of the meaning of the separate words. Accordingly, the proposition as a whole does not really enter into what has to be explained in explaining the meaning of a propositions. It would perhaps help to suggest the point of view which I am trying to indicate, to say that in the cases which have been considering the proposition occurs as a fact, not as a proposition. Such a statement, however, must not be taken too literally. The real point is that in believing, desiring,

etc. , what is logically fundamental is the relation of a proposition considered as a fact , to the fact which makes it true or false, and that this relation of two facts is reducible to a relation of their constituents. Thus the proposition does not occur at all in the same sense in which it occurs in a truth-function.