seems to be thinking of labor, or cost of production, as the chief element in value.74
In other passages, he insists on the doctrine taught previously by Democritus,75 and later by Xenophon and other philosophers, that so-called goods depend for their value upon the ability of the possessor to use them rightly.76 This idea is represented in modern thought especially by Ruskin.77
The theory is, of course, true of absolute value, and, in a sense, even of economic value, in that “all exchangeableness of a commodity depends upon the sum of capacity for its use.”78 It cannot be made a criterion of economic value, though the allied idea, implied by Plato and urged by Ruskin, that the innate quality of the thing, its capacity for good or harm, is a real element in economic value, is being recognized today.
This is evident in the increasing hostility toward such so-called commodities as opium and intoxicating liquors. Since we have begun to define political economy in terms of human life rather than in terms of property, Ruskin’s definition of wealth is more acceptable:
“the things which the nature of humanity has rendered in all ages, and must render in all ages to come ... the objects of legitimate desire.”79
WEALTH
Plato has much to say of wealth, though he deals with it strictly from the standpoint of the moralist. We look in vain for a clear definition, or for a consistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods. His terms are πλοῦτος, used of both material and spiritual wealth; χρήματα, often interpreted literally of “useful things,” as the basis of the subjective doctrine of value discussed above; κτήματα, “possessions,” and such words as χρυσός and ἀργύριον.