the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
Corollary II.—We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.
Proof.—If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary III.—We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.
Proof.—That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.
Note II.—This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else