all things are equal.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good.
(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end.)
III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be determined for producing them.
(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately.)
V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by