that the nobles had actually prevailed on the emperor to break the bridges, to arm the whole city, and to fall on the Spaniards with all available strength.8 Soldiers were readily found who fancied that the mayordomo was less obsequious than formerly, and that he gave scantier supplies. It was also understood from Tlascaltecs that the populace appeared less friendly during the last day or two. These reports may have sprung wholly from timid minds still agitated by the warnings uttered by Tlascaltecs before the departure from Cholula, or they may have been promoted by Cortés himself in furtherance of his plans. He at any rate seized the pretence to hold a council, composed of Alvarado, Leon, Ordaz, and Sandoval, together with twelve soldiers whose advice he most valued, “including myself,” says Bernal Diaz. His chief reason was to persuade them of the necessity for the measure he had resolved on, and to win their hearty coöperation. Laying before them the current rumors which confirmed the warnings formerly received, and representing the unreliable and suspicious character of Montezuma, his great power, and the peculiar position and strength of the city, he concluded by proposing the daring venture of seizing the emperor and holding him a hostage.9
Here was folly run mad! Four hundred men, after penetrating formidable barriers and gaining the very heart of a great empire, whose vast armies could oppose a thousand warriors to every Spaniard there, coolly propose to take captive the worshipped monarch of this vast realm, and then to defy its millions of subjects! The wildest tales of mediæval knights hardly equal this project. Reckless as was the conception, it was the fruit of yet greater audacity. Cortés reared his structure of folly insensate upon the platform of still greater insensate folly. If it was true that he had practically placed himself