redemptions) were available to buy stocks and bonds of other companies. And some of the stocks so acquired were sold at large profits, providing further sums to be employed in stock purchases.
The $375,000,000 Union Pacific Lines security issues, therefore, were not needed to supply funds for Union Pacific improvements; nor did these issues supply funds for the improvement of any of the companies in which the Union Pacific invested (except that certain amounts were advanced later to aid in financing the Southern Pacific). They served, substantially, no purpose save to transfer the ownership of railroad stocks from one set of persons to another.
Here are some of the principal investments:
1. $91,657,500, in acquiring and financing the Southern Pacific. 2. $89,391,401, in acquiring the Northern Pacific stock and stock of the Northern Securities Co. 3. $45,466,960, in acquiring Baltimore & Ohio stock. 4. $37,692,256, in acquiring Illinois Central stock. 5. $23,205,679, in acquiring New York Central stock. 6. $10,395,000, in acquiring Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe stock. 7. $8,946,781, in acquiring Chicago & Alton stock. 8. $11,610,187, in acquiring Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul stock. 9. $6,750,423, in acquiring Chicago & Northwestern stock. 10. $6,936,696, in acquiring Railroad Securities Co. stock (Illinois Central stock.)
The immediate effect of these stock acquisitions, as stated by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1907, was merely this:
“Mr. Harriman may journey by steamship from New York to New Orleans, thence by rail to San Francisco, across the Pacific Ocean to China, and, returning by another route to the United States, may go to Ogden by any one of three rail lines, and thence to Kansas City or