for his middleman-services, and what the bonds and stocks net the issuing corporation. That is knowledge to which both the existing security holder and the prospective purchaser is fairly entitled. If the bankers’ compensation is reasonable, considering the skill and risk involved, there can be no objection to making it known. If it is not reasonable, the investor will “strike,” as investors seem to have done recently in England.
Such disclosures of bankers’ commissions or profits is demanded also for another reason: It will aid the investor in judging of the safety of the investment. In the marketing of securities there are two classes of risks: One is the risk whether the banker (or the corporation) will find ready purchasers for the bonds or stock at the issue price; the other whether the investor will get a good article. The maker of the security and the banker are interested chiefly in getting it sold at the issue price. The investor is interested chiefly in buying a good article. The small investor relies almost exclusively upon the banker for his knowledge and judgment as to the quality of the security; and it is this which makes his relation to the banker one of confidence. But at present, the investment banker occupies a position inconsistent with that relation. The bankers’ compensation should, of course, vary according to the risk he assumes. Where there is a large risk that the bonds or stock will not be promptly sold at the issue price, the underwriting commission (that is the insurance premium) should be correspondingly large. But the banker ought not to be paid more for getting investors to assume a larger risk. In practice the banker gets the higher commission for underwriting the weaker security, on the ground that his own risk is greater. And the weaker the security, the greater is the banker’s incentive to induce his customers to relieve him. Now the law should not undertake (except incidentally in connection with railroads and public-service corporations) to fix bankers’ profits. And it should not seek to prevent investors from making bad bargains. But it is now recognized in the simplest merchandising, that there should be full disclosures. The