“We discover truth,” he says, “not only by reasoning, but by feeling (*le cœur*); and it is in this latter manner that we discover first principles—and in vain does reasoning, which has no share in their production, try to combat these principles. The Pyrrhonists, who attempt this, labour in vain. page 189We know that we are not deceived, however incapable we may be of proving so by any power of reasoning. This incapacity only demonstrates the weakness of our reasoning faculty, and not the incertitude of all our knowledge, as they pretend. Nay, our knowledge of first principles, such as the ideas of *space*, *time*, *motion*, *number*, is as certain as any obtained by reasoning. It is, in fact, upon such conclusions of feeling and instinct that Reason must ultimately rest and base all its arguments. We *feel* that there are three dimensions in space, and that numbers are infinite; and reason hence demonstrates that there are no two square numbers the one of which is double the other. Principles are felt, propositions deduced, and both with certitude, although in different ways. And it is as absurd for the ‘reason’ to demand of the ‘heart’ proofs of its first principles before asserting them, as it would be for the ‘heart’ to demand of the ‘reason’ a *feeling* of all propositions that she demonstrates before accepting them. This weakness, therefore, should only serve to humble reason in its desire to make itself judge of everything, but by no means to moderate the certitude of our conviction, as if reason were alone capable of instructing us.” 12
There may be something to object to in Pascal’s mode of expression in the above passage. Cousin has made the most of his