Theoretically an unduly low level of home prices should stimulate exports and so cure itself. But in Germany, and still more in Poland and Austria, there is little or nothing to export. There must be imports before there can be exports.

Allowing for the diminished value of gold, the exchange value of the franc should be less than 40 per cent of its previous value, instead of the actual figure of about 60 per cent, if the fall were proportional to the increase in the volume of the currency.

How very far from equilibrium France's international exchange now is can be seen from the following table: Monthly Average Imports $1,000 Exports $1,000 Excess of Imports $1,000 1913 140,355 114,670 25,685 1914 106,705 81,145 25,560 1918 331,915 69,055 262,860 Jan.-Mar. 1919 387,140 66,670 320,470 Apr.-June 1919 421,410 83,895 337,515 July 1919 467,565 123,675 343,890 These figures have been converted, at approximately par rates, but this is roughly compensated by the fact that the trade of 1918 and 1919 has been valued at 1917 official rates. French imports cannot possibly continue at anything approaching these figures, and the semblance of prosperity based on such a state of affairs is spurious.