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nydus/The Sceptical ChymistPublic

Robert Boyle presents a series of philosophical dialogues between the characters Carneades and Eleutherius. The text examines the author's reasons for questioning both Peripatetic and chemical doctrines regarding the material principles of mixed bodies.

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Table of Contents

Part of the First Dialogue.

I see not (saies Eleutherius) why you might not immediately begin to argue, if you were but agreed which of your two friendly Adversaries shall be first heard. And it being quickly resolv’d on that Themistius should first propose the Proofs for his Opinion, because it was the antienter, and the more general, he made not the company expect long before he thus addressed himself to Eleutherius, as to the Person least interessed in the dispute.

If you have taken sufficient notice of the late Confession which was made by Carneades, and which (though his Civility dressed it up in complementall Expressions) was exacted of him by his Justice, I suppose You will be easily made sensible, that I engage in this Controversie with great and peculiar Disadvantages, besides those which his Parts and my Personal Disabilities would bring to any other cause to be maintained by me against him. For he justly apprehending the force of truth, though speaking by no better a tongue then mine, has made it the chief condition of our Duell, that I should lay aside the best Weapons I have, and those I can best handle; Whereas if I were allowed the freedom, in pleading for the four Elements, to employ the Arguments suggested to me by Reason to demonstrate them, I should almost as little doubt of making You a Proselyte to those unsever’d Teachers, Truth and Aristotle, as I do of your Candour and your Judgment. And I hope you will however consider, that that great Favorite and Interpreter of Nature, Aristotle, who was (as his Organum witnesses) the greatest Master of Logick that ever liv’d, disclaim’d the course taken by other petty Philosophers (Antient and Modern) who not attending the Coherence and Consequences of their Opinions, are more sollicitous to make each particular Opinion plausible independently upon the the rest, then to frame them all so, as not only to be consistent together, but to support each other. For that great Man in his vast and comprehensive Intellect, so fram’d each of his Notions, that being curiously adapted into one Systeme, they need not each of them any other defence then that which their mutuall Coherence gives them: As ’tis in an Arch, where each single stone, which if

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