inquiry. His neighbour, opposed as he was to Jansenism, would not condemn the doctrine of efficacious grace. The doctrine, on the contrary, was quite orthodox, was held by the Jesuits, and had even been defended by himself in his thesis at the Sorbonne. The inquirer is confounded, and ventures to ask then in what M. Arnauld’s heresy consisted? “In this,” replies his friend, “that he does not acknowledge that the just have the power of obeying the commandments of God in the way in which we understand it.” Having got to what he supposes the “heart of the affair,” he posts off to a Jansenist acquaintance, “a very decent man notwithstanding.” But if he was puzzled before, he is still more puzzled when he hears the worthy Jansenist declare that it is no heresy to hold that “all the just have always the power of obeying the Divine commandments.” Confounded by such a reply, he felt that he had been too plain-spoken with both Jansenist and Molinist.7 There must be something more in this dispute than he understood; and if not, there was no reason why there page 121should not now be peace in the Church and the Sorbonne. He returned to the Molinist, whom he had first visited, with this assurance. The Jansenists, he said, were quite at one with the Jesuits as to the power of the righteous always to obey the commandments of God.
“All very well,” said he, “but you must be a theologian to see the gist of the matter. The difference between us is so subtle that we can hardly make it out ourselves. It is quite beyond *your* understanding. Suffice it for you to know that the Jansenists will indeed say that the just have always the power of obeying the commandments—this is not the point in dispute; but they will not say that this power is *proximate*. *That* is the point.”
Mystified more than ever by this new and unknown expression, of which he could get no explanation, the inquirer now returned to his Jansenist friend to demand of him if he admitted it. “Do you admit the *proximate