“Have we not shown that those things which most men desire are not true and perfect good precisely for this cause⁠—that they differ severally one from another, and, seeing that one is wanting to another, they cannot bestow full and absolute good; but that they become the true good when they are gathered, as it were, into one form and agency, so that that which is independence is likewise power, reverence, renown, and pleasant delight, and unless they are all one and the same, they have no claim to be counted among things desirable?”

“Yes; this was clearly proved, and cannot in any wise be doubted.”

“Now, when things are far from being good while they are different, but become good as soon as they are one, is it not true that these become good by acquiring unity?”

“It seems so,” said I.

“But dost not thou allow that all which is good is good by participation in goodness?”

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