i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.

The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.

Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].