pleasure in acting justly, or liberal who does not in liberal actions, and similarly in the case of the other virtues which might be enumerated: and if this be so, then the actions in accordance with virtue must be in themselves pleasurable. Then again they are certainly good and noble, and each of these in the highest degree; if we are to take as right the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have said.
Thus then Happiness is most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant, and these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian inscription—
“Most noble is that which is most just, but best is health;
And naturally most pleasant is the obtaining one’s desires.”
For all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say that Happiness is these, or one, that is, the best of them.
Still26 it is quite plain that it does require the addition of external goods, as we have said: because without appliances