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nydus/A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s CourtPublic

An engineer from 19th-century Connecticut is sent back in time to King Arthur’s medieval England.

Page 137 of 400
Table of Contents

XVIII

seen that the crowned head could do it with his slave, that is to say, anybody. A gentleman could kill a free commoner, and pay for him⁠—cash or garden-truck. A noble could kill a noble without expense, as far as the law was concerned, but reprisals in kind were to be expected. Any body could kill some body, except the commoner and the slave; these had no privileges. If they killed, it was murder, and the law wouldn’t stand murder. It made short work of the experimenter⁠—and of his family, too, if he murdered somebody who belonged up among the ornamental ranks. If a commoner gave a noble even so much as a Damiens-scratch which didn’t kill or even hurt, he got Damiens’ dose for it just the same; they pulled him to rags and tatters with horses, and all the world came to see the show, and crack jokes, and have a good time; and some of the performances of the best people present were as tough, and as properly unprintable, as any that have been printed by the pleasant Casanova in his chapter about the dismemberment of Louis XV ’s poor awkward enemy.

I had had enough of this grisly place by this time, and wanted to leave, but I couldn’t, because I had something on my mind that my conscience kept prodding me about, and wouldn’t let me forget. If I had the remaking of man, he wouldn’t have any conscience. It is one of the most disagreeable things connected with a person; and although it certainly does a great deal of good, it cannot be said to pay, in the long run; it would be much better to have less good and more comfort. Still, this is only my opinion, and I am only one man; others, with less experience, may think differently. They have a right to their view. I only stand to this: I have noticed my conscience for many years, and I know it is more trouble and bother to me than anything else I started with. I suppose that in the beginning I prized it, because we prize anything that is ours; and yet how foolish it was to think so. If we look at it in another way, we see how absurd it is: if I had an anvil in me would I prize it? Of course not. And yet when you come to think, there is no real difference between a conscience and an anvil⁠—I mean for comfort. I have noticed it a

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