the more slight the variation of the meaning, the more likely is the fallacy to be successful; for when the words have become so widely removed in sense as ‘pity’ and ‘pitiful,’ every one would perceive such a fallacy, nor would it be employed but in jest.1
“The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather, perhaps, may be regarded as a branch of, that founded on etymology—viz., when a term is used, at one time in its customary, and at another in its etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative: assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb ‘represent,’ the sophist persuades the multitude that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and, in short, to be merely their spokesman; whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on his own responsibility.”
The following are instances of great practical importance, in which arguments are habitually founded on a verbal ambiguity.
The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the phrase “scarcity of money.” In the language of commerce, “money” has two meanings: currency, or the circulating medium; and capital seeking investment, especially investment on loan. In this last sense the word is used when the “money market” is spoken of, and when the “value of money” is said to be high or low, the rate of interest being meant. The consequence [pg 565] of this ambiguity is, that as soon as scarcity of money in the latter of these senses begins to be felt—as soon as there is difficulty of obtaining loans, and the rate of interest is high—it is concluded that this must arise from causes acting upon the quantity of money in the other and more popular sense; that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought to be increased. I am aware that, independently of the double meaning of the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities, giving an apparent support to this error; but the ambiguity of the language stands on the very threshold of the subject, and intercepts all attempts to throw light upon it.
Another ambiguous expression which continually meets us in the political controversies of the present time, especially in those which relate to organic changes, is the phrase “influence of property”—which is sometimes used for the influence of respect for superior intelligence or gratitude for the kind offices which persons of large property have it so much in their power to bestow; at other times for the influence of fear; fear of the worst sort of power, which large property also gives to its possessor, the power of doing mischief to dependents. To confound these two, is the standing fallacy of ambiguity brought against those who seek to purify the electoral system from corruption and intimidation. Persuasive influence, acting through the conscience of the voter, and carrying his heart and mind with it, is beneficial—therefore (it is pretended) coercive influence, which compels him to forget that he is a moral agent, or to act in opposition to his moral convictions, ought not to be placed under restraint.
Another word which is often turned into an instrument of the fallacy of ambiguity, is Theory. In its most proper acceptation, theory means the completed result of philosophical induction from experience. In that sense, there are erroneous as well as true theories, for induction may be incorrectly performed, but theory of some sort is the necessary result of knowing any thing of a subject, and having put one’s knowledge into the form of general propositions for the guidance of practice. In this, the proper sense of the word, Theory is the