anything be more unhappy than a despotic government of that kind, where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and must be determined on every occasion by force or election. In a free government the matter is often unavoidable, and is also much less dangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the people in their own defence to alter the succession of the crown, and the constitution being compounded of parts, may still maintain a sufficient stability by resting on the aristocratical or democratical members, though the monarchical be altered from time to time in order to accommodate it to the former.
In an absolute government when there is no legal prince who has a title to the throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the first occupier. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially in the Eastern monarchies. When any race of princes expires the will or destination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of Louis XIV., who called the bastard princes to the succession in case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such an event, have some authority.104 Thus the will of {p191} Charles II. disposed of the whole Spanish monarchy. The cession of the ancient proprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise esteemed a very good title. The general bond of obligation which unites us to government is the interest and necessities of society, and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these cases, and greater than in private property, because of the disorders which attend all revolutions and changes of government.105
We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no standard by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous than to