sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right, and whatever disadvantageous sentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public justice. This passion we may denominate enthusiasm, or we may give it what appellation we please; but a politician who should overlook its influence on human affairs would prove himself but of a very limited understanding. There is, indeed, no particular in which at first sight there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a faction they are apt, without any shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality in order to serve their party; and yet when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occasion where men discover a greater obstinacy and a more determined sense of justice and equity. The same social disposition of mankind is the cause of both these contradictory appearances.
It is sufficiently understood that the opinion of right to property is of the greatest moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and most of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but still it must be owned that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this subject.
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to power, and of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles which add force to these, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; such as {p245} self-interest, fear, and affection. But still we may assert that these other principles can have no influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions above mentioned. They are therefore to be esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of government.