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nydus/The Art of WarPublic
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ARTICLE XXII.

Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. There were but three courses open to him,—to remain in the narrow valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, or the last,—which was sublime, but rash,—to follow him into the valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano. The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a strategic line of maneuver still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre. However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there

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