This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of complaint.
Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great importance,—that the troops be made to understand they must by no means despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point; because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have supposed in his power.
COUPS DE MAIN.
These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the capture of posts of different strength or importance.2 They partake of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a successful issue. Although coups de main seem to be entirely tactical operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the