permitted to doubt whether a mother country may not sometimes be benefited by the restraints to which she subjects her colonial possessions. Who can doubt, for example, that if England were the colony of France, the latter country would be benefited by a heavy bounty paid by England on the exportation of corn, cloth, or any other commodities? In examining the question of bounties, on the supposition of corn being at 4 l. per quarter in this country, we saw, that with a bounty of 10 s. per quarter, on exportation in England, corn would have been reduced to 3 l. 10 s. in France. Now, if corn had previously been at 3 l. 15 s. per quarter in France, the French consumers would have been benefited by 5 s. per quarter on all imported corn; if the natural price of corn in France were before 4 l. , they would have gained the whole bounty of 10 s. per quarter. France would thus be benefited by the loss sustained by England: she would not gain a part only of what England lost, but in some cases the whole.
It may however be said, that a bounty on exportation is a measure of internal policy, and could not easily be imposed by the mother country.
If it would suit the interests of Jamaica and Holland to make an exchange of the commodities which they respectively produce, without the intervention of England, it is quite certain, that by their being prevented from so doing, the interests of Holland and Jamaica would suffer; but if Jamaica is obliged to send her goods to England, and there exchange them for Dutch goods, an English capital, or English agency, will be employed in a trade in which it would not otherwise be engaged. It is allured thither by a bounty, not paid by England, but by Holland and Jamaica.
That the loss sustained, through a disadvantageous distribution of labour in two countries, may be beneficial to one of them, while the other is made to suffer more than the loss actually belonging to such a distribution, has been stated by Adam Smith himself; which, if true, will