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nydus/The Art of WarPublic
Page 251 of 519
Table of Contents

ARTICLE XXXI.

Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the moment when Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont, nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them, for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.

As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.

Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be still expected to arrive on the field.

From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an

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