officer. If this trinity be harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army of Silesia in 1813.
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.