little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as much mischief as a rout.
If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns; and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space which has been lost.
The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind.