engaged to send over forces into Greece, to assist him in subduing the Grecian commonwealths.
The Rhodean and Achæan republics are much celebrated by ancient historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them assisted the Romans in their wars against Philip and Antiochus. And what may be esteemed still a stronger proof that this maxim was not familiarly known in those ages, no ancient author has ever remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty above-mentioned made by Philip with the Carthaginians. Princes and statesmen may in all ages be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events beforehand, but it is somewhat extraordinary that historians afterwards should not form a sounder judgment of them.
Massinissa, Attalus, Prusias, in satisfying their private passions, were all of them the instruments of the Roman greatness, and never seem to have suspected that they were forging their own chains while they advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement between Massinissa and the Carthaginians, so much required by mutual interest, barred the Romans from all entrance into Africa, and preserved liberty to mankind.
The only prince we meet with in the Roman history who seems to have understood the balance of power is Hiero, King of Syracuse. Though the ally of Rome, he sent assistance to the Carthaginians during the war of the auxiliaries: “Esteeming it requisite,” says Polybius, “both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence; for that is never, on any account, to be overlooked, nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it.” Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.