many armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.1 In addition to this, since a position naturally very strong2 is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to Wurmser in Mantua.
STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle.
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions,—for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class.
This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the