A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies concerned in them.
In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army,—the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of Marshal Daun.1 Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed.
The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,—while their left was piled up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making a wide détour to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was speedily surrounded and captured.
No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst Saint-Cyr,