I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808 from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they could not have done if they had been deployed.
At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.
The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these deep columns were very different from the small columns which I proposed,—a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery.