Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?
Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.4 If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was France, and this to such an extent that