evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing his way through your line.
I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in 1812.
Fig. 40.
The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus fifteen hundred miles from its true base.
There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.
At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a few days later.