If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.
The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank Flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon the left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only twelve battalions were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and to beat all his large detachments in detail.
Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up between the sea and two fortresses?
The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi till the 3d of June,—more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by its