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nydus/The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and MethodPublic
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Table of Contents

PART IV NATURE

are closely related. But though the perceived object and its environment remain constant, the sufficiently powerful mind can, as we say, dispel these illusions, the perception itself being creatively changed. Photo-graphs taken at intervals during the presence of these optical illusions, during the change, perhaps gradual and unconscious, in the perception, and after these illusions have, as the phrase is, finally disappeared, show quite clearly that changes in eye-movements corresponding to those internally created in perception itself successively occur. What is called accuracy of movement is created by what is called correctness of perception. The higher creation in the perception is the determining cause of an improvement, a precision in the motion. Thus we see correct perception in the individual helping to make that cerebral organization and accurate motor adjustment on which its possibility and permanence seem in so far to depend. So-called correct perception is connected with a long-continued process of perceptual education motived and initiated from within. How this may take place is here illustrated at length by our author.

  1. Euclid not Necessary.—Geometry is a construction of the intellect, in application not certain but convenient. As Schiller says, when we see these facts as clearly as the development of metageometry has compelled us to see them, we must surely confess that the Kantian account of space is hopelessly and demonstrably antiquated. As Royce says in 'Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics,' "That very use of intuition which Kant regarded as geometrically ideal, the modern geometer regards as scientifically defective, because surreptitious. No mathematical exactness without explicit proof from assumed principles—such is the motto of the modern geometer. But suppose the reasoning of Euclid purified of this comparatively surreptitious appeal to intuition. Suppose that the principles of geometry are made quite explicit at the outset of the
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