or denied positively, as far as depends upon itself; as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions; as for instance, “It is day,” “Dion is walking.” And it has received the name of axiom, ἀξίωμα, because it is either maintained, ἀξιοῦται, or repudiated. For the man who says, “It is day,” appears to maintain the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the axiom put before one is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. And an axiom, a question, and an interrogation, differ from one another, and so does an imperative proposition from one which is adjurative, or imprecatory, or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an axiom which we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or false. And a question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an axiom, but which requires an answer, as for instance, “Is it day?” Now this is neither true nor false; but, as “It is day” is an axiom; so is, “Is it day?” a question. But an interrogation, πύσμα, is a thing to which it is not possible to make an answer symbolically, as in the case of a question, ἐρώτημα, saying merely “Yes,” but we must reply, “He does live in this place.”
The imperative proposition is a thing which we utter when we give an order, as for instance this:—
The appellative proposition is one which is used in the case in which, when a man says anything, he must address somebody, as for instance:—
A false judgment is a proposition, which, while it has at the same time the appearance of a real judgment, loses this character by the addition, and under the influence of, some particle, as for instance:
There is also the dubitative proposition, which differs from the judgment, inasmuch as it is always uttered in the form of a doubt; as for instance:—
But questions, and interrogations, and things like these,