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Chapter III. Modern or Analytical Geometry

MODERN OR ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY.

General (or Analytical) geometry being entirely founded upon the transformation of geometrical considerations into equivalent analytical considerations, we must begin with examining directly and in a thorough manner the beautiful conception by which Descartes has established in a uniform manner the constant possibility of such a co-relation. Besides its own extreme importance as a means of highly perfecting geometrical science, or, rather, of establishing the whole of it on rational bases, the philosophical study of this admirable conception must have so much the greater interest in our eyes from its characterizing with perfect clearness the general method to be employed in organizing the relations of the abstract to the concrete in mathematics, by the analytical representation of natural phenomena. There is no conception, in the whole philosophy of mathematics which better deserves to fix all our attention.

ANALYTICAL REPRESENTATION OF FIGURES.

In order to succeed in expressing all imaginable geometrical phenomena by simple analytical relations, we must evidently, in the first place, establish a general method for representing analytically the subjects themselves in which these phenomena are found, that is, the lines or the surfaces to be considered. The subject being thus habitually considered in a purely analytical point of view, we see how it is thenceforth possible to conceive in the same manner the various accidents of which it is susceptible.

In order to organize the representation of geometrical figures by analytical equations, we must previously surmount a fundamental difficulty; that of reducing the general elements of the various conceptions of geometry to simply numerical ideas; in a word, that of substituting in geometry pure considerations of quantity for all considerations of quality.

Reduction of Figure to Position. For this purpose let us observe, in the first place, that all geometrical ideas relate necessarily to these three universal categories: the magnitude, the figure, and the position of the extensions to be considered. As to the first, there is evidently no difficulty; it enters at once into the ideas of numbers. With relation to the second, it must be remarked that it will always admit of being reduced to the third. For the figure of a body evidently results from the mutual position of the different points of which it is composed, so that the idea of position necessarily comprehends that of figure, and every circumstance of figure can be translated by a circumstance of position. It is in this way, in fact, that the human mind has proceeded in order to arrive at the analytical representation of geometrical figures, their conception relating directly only to positions. All the elementary difficulty is then properly reduced to that of referring ideas of situation to ideas of magnitude. Such is the direct destination of the preliminary conception upon which Descartes has established the general system of analytical geometry.

His philosophical labour, in this relation, has consisted simply in the entire generalization of an elementary operation, which we may regard as natural to the human mind, since it is performed spontaneously, so to say, in all minds, even the most uncultivated. Thus, when we have to indicate the situation of an object without directly pointing it out, the method which we always adopt, and evidently the only one which can be

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