mission; but they were also aware that, whatever might be the prowess of the visitors and the power of their weapons and steeds, they were mortals, for this had been proved quite lately by the unfortunate defeat of Escalante, and in the Nautla campaign. The soldiers of Montezuma had but to raise the bridges of the causeways and cut off retreat, then stop supplies and reduce them by starvation. > True, there was the fate of Cholula before the Mexicans; but they had gained experience, and could mass vastly more warriors and arms, while the Spaniards would have no allies in reserve to operate in the rear. Besides, what mattered the destruction of a part, or even of the entire city, when thereupon depended the safety of the throne, menaced by a horde of cruel, avaricious
Cortés had considered all these points, and knew the expediency of resolute action. He had undertaken an enterprise wherein one bold move must be supported by another, and to these all means had to be subordinate. He had not come all this way to place himself within the power of a suspicious and vacillating despot, nor to waste his time in waiting for what events might bring forth, while his enemies, headed by Velazquez, were arranging for his overthrow.
He had formed his plans long beforehand, as indicated in his first letter to the king, wherein he promised to have the great Montezuma “a prisoner, a corpse, or a subject to the royal crown of your Majesty.”7
Conquest, followed by settlement and conversion, was his aim. It would not pay him to play for a smaller stake.
Just now rumors began to circulate tending to stir anew the fears which Montezuma’s friendly and hospitable demeanor had soothed. One was