These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality, and might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and army. Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico.
Immediately after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the hands of victorious Mexico.
Thus, while many were frightened into severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of affairs.
To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. > “It was now more necessary than ever,” he writes, “to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to hide our weakness both from friends and foes.” Andrés de Tápia was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with a considerable force of allies.39 In order to calm the many remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return within ten days. Tápia found the enemy