in the position of a captive, then he would cut the knot by capturing the captor. And yet, foolhardy as might appear the scheme when coolly viewed from the isle of Cuba, situated as the Spaniards were, it was doubtless the best they could do; it was doubtless all they could do. The efficiency of hostages had been frequently tried by the conquerors in the Antilles, and the opportune seizure of the Cempoalan lord had not been forgotten; but this had been effected under the impulse of the moment, while the chieftain was surrounded by Spaniards. Here was required not only a calm resolution, unflinching to the end, but a well laid stratagem. Cortés stood prepared with both.
Producing the letter from Villa Rica, which had been kept secret all this time, he gave an account of the unfortunate successes at Almería, describing in exaggerated terms the treachery of Quauhpopoca, and consequently of Montezuma as his master, and stirring the feelings of the council by an appeal to avenge their comrades.10
Here was a pretence11 which served also to set aside the suggestion that the emperor would be only too glad to let them depart in peace, for it was argued that a retreat now, since the Spaniards stood revealed as mortals, would draw upon them not only the contempt of allies and countrymen, but a general uprising, with the most fatal results.
Retreat meant also the surrender of all hopes of wealth, preferment, and honor, to be followed by punishment and disgrace for their irregular proceedings so far. With Montezuma in their power, they possessed a hostage whose sacredness in the eyes of his subjects insured their safety, and made the people pliable to their will, while disaffected vassals could be secured by alliances, or by the promise of reforms.
Should the seizure result in the monarch’s death, the succession would doubtless become the cause of division and dissension, in the midst of which the Spaniards might influence affairs in their own interest.
Thus were answered the various objections raised.