Although Alvarado had made little advance into the city, the planting of his camp so near it saved much fighting and enabled him to direct daily operations almost at once against the main points. In this he possessed an advantage over Cortés, who was compelled daily to recapture a number of positions already gained. He himself remarks on this loss of time and work.
“Your Majesty may blame me for retreating instead of holding what is gained,” he writes, but guards at the bridges, which must be large, would be so harassed as to unfit them for the next day’s work, while to take up a position within the city would draw the whole of the large population upon them, and might lead to the cutting off of communication and supplies, and probably to a repetition of the great disaster of the previous year. Such a position would besides render it possible for the Mexicans to obtain supplies from the mainland, for the Spanish allies could not be relied on to watch them.
Cortés’ own officers, however, could not fail to observe that Alvarado’s course might have been followed with some advantage. They began to tire of the slow progress, attended as it was with so much fighting for so little gain; so much exposure to alternate rain and heat; so much discomfort in rude camps with poor diet and want of proper care for wounded or sick men.
This was represented to Cortés, with the request that a general storming be attempted with a view to abbreviate the siege. He represented the danger of advancing over so many channels, along streets lined with houses, against hosts of determined warriors, with the prospect of being caught in the rear. Still he was as eager as any one to end the siege, and would call a council to deliberate on the matter. The result was a decided majority for the proposition to attempt the capture of Tlatelulco market and there establish a permanent camp.19