This was a great but a rash victory. The American infantry relying chiefly on the bayonet and expecting to effect its object by surprise and even at an earlier hour of the morning, advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty-one men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field selected by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches, commanded by the fortress of Chapultepec and the ground swept by artillery, while four thousand cavalry threatened an overwhelming charge! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of numbers, but although we believe that our officers did not anticipate so strong a resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at first upon the fatal work of mortars and siege pieces, of which we had abundance, and, then, to have permitted the bayonet to complete the task the battering train had begun. If the difficulty of moving rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a night attack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the plan of battle even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns, effectually destroyed a post which had been the slaughter house of many a noble American soldier. The Mexican cavalry behaved shamefully. In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of the Mexican Apuntes para la historia de la Guerra, &c., p.