whether by a tax or otherwise, might possibly take place without checking the increase of population. The tax would in that case fall on the laborers [pg 554] themselves, and would reduce them prematurely to that lower state to which, on the same supposition with regard to their habits, they would in any case have been reduced ultimately, by the inevitable diminution in the rate of increase of capital, through the occupation of all the fertile land.
Some will object that, even in this case, a tax on wages can not be detrimental to the laborers, since the money raised by it, being expended in the country, comes back to the laborers again through the demand for labor. Without, however, reverting to general principles, we may rely on an obvious reductio ad absurdum.
If to take money from the laborers and spend it in commodities is giving it back to the laborers, then, to take money from other classes, and spend it in the same manner, must be giving it to the laborers; consequently, the more a government takes in taxes, the greater will be the demand for labor, and the more opulent the condition of the laborers—a proposition the absurdity of which no one can fail to see.
In the condition of most communities, wages are regulated by the habitual standard of living to which the laborers adhere, and on less than which they will not multiply. Where there exists such a standard, a tax on wages will indeed for a time be borne by the laborers themselves; but, unless this temporary depression has the effect of lowering the standard itself, the increase of population will receive a check, which will raise wages, and restore the laborers to their previous condition. On whom, in this case, will the tax fall? A rise of wages occasioned by a tax must, like any other increase of the cost of labor, be defrayed from profits. To