a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full details on this point are given in the description of the battle of Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years'
- We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense,—as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo. Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.
When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining idle spectators of it.
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is to know how to take the offensive at a proper time, and to take it. Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo. Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely open field;