Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia, Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which seemed so very complicated.
In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army quietly in cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was attending fêtes in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon Charleroi and Blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not leave Paris until the 12th.)
The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures, I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had been on his way