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The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the “Science of Morals” belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-fingered:⁠—an interesting contrast, which sometimes becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. Indeed, the expression, “Science of Morals” is, in respect to what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to good taste⁠—which is always a foretaste of more modest expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness what is still necessary here for a long time, what is alone proper for the present: namely, the collection of material, the comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth, which live, grow, propagate, and perish⁠—and perhaps attempts to give a clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living crystallizations⁠—as preparation for a theory of types of morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. All the philosophers, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, demanded of themselves something very much higher, more pretentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned themselves with morality as a science: they wanted to give a basis to morality⁠—and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he has given it a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as something “given.” How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly insignificant problem⁠—left in dust and decay⁠—of a description of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and senses could hardly be fine enough for it! It was precisely owing to moral philosophers’ knowing the moral facts imperfectly, in an arbitrary epitome, or an accidental abridgement⁠—perhaps as the morality of their environment, their position, their church, their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone⁠—it was precisely because they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past ages, and were by no means eager to