He was intensely shy and reserved, shrinking from publicity and holding himself aloof from the human side of war. He was constitutionally unable to make a dramatic gesture before a multitude, or to say easy, stirring things to officers and men whom he reviewed. His shyness and reserve prevented him also from knowing as much as he ought to have known about the opinions of officers and men, and getting direct information from them. He held the supreme command of the British armies on the western front when, in the battlefields of the Somme and Flanders, of Picardy and Artois, there was not much chance for daring strategy, but only for hammer-strokes by the flesh and blood of men against fortress positions⁠—the German trench systems, twenty-five miles deep in tunneled earthworks and machine-gun dugouts⁠—when the immensity of casualties among British troops was out of all proportion to their gains of ground, so that our men’s spirits revolted against these massacres of their youth and they were embittered against the generalship and staff-work which directed these sacrificial actions.