In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive, it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.

I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.

The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable.

I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated from his usual custom by issuing a general order.

Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten. In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often indispensable.